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PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING:
PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONMAKING
Clyde W. Summers*
My assigned function is to give the "keynote" for this symposium, a
puzzling, if not pretentious, function. The term "keynote" is commonly
used to describe the opening address of a political convention. The pur-
pose of such a keynote is to generate enthusiasm for the election of an un-
named candidate on an undecided platform with a speech which is "full
of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Hopefully, I will not perform that
function. Perhaps the keynote should provide the key to unlock the doors
to an understanding of public employee bargaining. But Theodore Clark's
paper makes it look more like Pandora's box which has loosed a plague of
political evils. My keynote function is a modest one: to provide a key to
the map of public employee bargaining which is spread before us all, in
order that we may reach some better understanding of what we are view-
ing, see the contours of the terrain, and find our way to where we want
to go.
I. TnE UNIQUENESS OF PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
It is a threadbare truism that bargaining in the public sector is different
from bargaining in the private sector, but the differences are often de-
scribed in unhelpful detail, too much like the four blind men describing
an elephant. Such descriptions will not help us either to make it work
or to keep it under control. We ought, therefore, to describe the differences
in more general and fundamental terms. To do that, we must start with
the basic question: What, exactly, is unique about public sector bar-
gaining?
There is nothing unique about public employees; they are no different
from employees in the private sector. They have the same capacities, the
same needs, and the same values; they seek the same advantages and the
same gains. Many public sector employees previously have been, and
with present trends perhaps even more will again become, private sector
employees.
There is nothing unique about the work which public employees per-
form. The private sector has school teachers, nurses and social workers,
as well as secretaries, bookkeepers, janitors, maintenance employees, con-
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struction workers, and rubbish collectors. There are private police, private
detectives, private armed guards, and even private firefighters. Nor is the
work necessarily any more critical because it is performed by public em-
ployees. Strikes by parochial school teachers create substantially the same
inconvenience as strikes by public school teachers. A strike by janitors
in public buildings may create fewer problems than a strike by janitors
in private apartment buildings. A disruption in garbage collection may
be less serious than a disruption in electric power or telephone service.
The uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor in
the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the em-
ployer. The employer is government; the ones who act on behalf of the
employer are public officials; and the ones to whom those officials are
answerable are citizens and voters. We have developed a whole structure
of constitutional and statutory principles, and a whole culture of political
practices and attitudes as to how government is to be conducted, what
powers public officials are to exercise, and how they are to be made answer-
able for their actions. Collective bargaining by public employers must fit
within the governmental structure and must function consistently with our
governmental processes; the problems of the public employer accommodat-
ing its collective bargaining function to government structures and processes
is what makes public sector bargaining unique.
To state the difference another way, in private sector bargaining we
have never been concerned with how the employer decided on the policy
to be brought to the bargaining table. We have been concerned with the
union's decisionmaking process, requiring the union to observe minimal
democratic standards, but we have not been concerned with the corpora-
tion's decisionmaking process. All that the law has required is that the
employer send someone to the bargaining table who has authority to speak
for and to bind the employer. Who instructs the negotiator, how his in-
structions are determined, and what his instructions may be is for the
corporation to decide. The corporation's decisionmaking process is of no
concern in collective bargaining; it is of little concern to the law.
When the employer is government, however, the employer's decision-
making process becomes of central concern in both legal and political
terms. The policies brought to the bargaining table are governmental
policies. State constitutions and statutes, city charters and ordinances may
prescribe procedures as to how those policies are to be decided, specify
what bodies or officials shall make those decisions, and impose limitations
on the decisions which can be made.
More specifically, in the private sector, the employer must send some
one to the bargaining table with authority to make a binding agreement.
In the public sector this may not be legally possible or politically sensible.
Wages and other benefits directly affect the budget and the tax rates; but
adopting budgets and levying taxes are considered, within our governmen-
tal system, fundamental legislative policies to be decided by the legislative
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body, not by a negotiator at the bargaining table. Dismissal procedures
may be subject to constitutional requirements which limit the procedures
which can be negotiated. Promotion policies may be governed by civil
service principles which are written into the city charter and cannot be
eliminated by bargaining. Modifications in state pension plans cannot, in
most states, be made binding by negotiators, but must be ratified by the
legislature. In the public sector, agreement at the bargaining table may
be only an intermediate, not a final, step in the decisionmaking process.
Collective bargaining by a governmental employer is different because
governmental decisionmaking is different. The unique problems, and the
ones of central concern, focus on how government makes its decision. The
unique and interesting legal problems are created by legal limitations on
governmental decisionmaking. Beyond the legal problems, however, are
the far more important ones of how the governmental decisions in col-
lective bargaining ought to be made. The problems are more in the realm
of political science than of labor relations. Our central concern is not,
as in the private sector, with what will facilitate bargaining and reaching
agreement, but with what are appropriate processes for governmental deci-
sionmaking.
Two cases illustrate this crucial difference between the central questions
in public sector and private sector bargaining. In Madison School District
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,' a school teacher at a public
meeting of the school board presented a petition urging the board not to
agree to a "fair shares" provision in the agreement then being negotiated
with the union. The board was charged with a prohibited labor practice
for allowing the teacher to speak and for accepting the petition. In the
private sector such conduct is barred because it may weaken the union's
position as extlusive representative and may interfere with the bargaining
process. In the public sector, we must confront the question whether
citizens, teachers or otherwise, shall be allowed to make their views known
to public officials on public issues. Beyond the constitutional issues of
free speech and the right to petition is the judgmental question whether
those making governmental decisions should be barred from hearing all
views and opinions of all citizens before making decisions. The central
concern is not the collective bargaining process but the governmental
process.
In Detroit Police Officers v. City of Detroit,2 the voters of the city wrote
into the city charter the benefits payable under the police and firemen's
pension plan. As a result, those benefits could be changed only by refer-
endum. This, of course, impeded the bargaining process; but that does
not end the inquiry in the public sector. The legal question is whether
the collective agreement can override the results of a referendum, but the
1. 231 N.W.2d 206 (Wis. 1975).
2. 214 N.W.2d 803 (1972) 341 Mich. 44.
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crucial political question is who should have the final voice in determining
the city's pension obligations. When we realize that the pension plan
may create a larger long term obligation than any bond issue, creating
a lien of undefined size for an indeterminate period, there are strong
arguments for requiring voter approval, even though that impedes bar-
gaining. Again the question is not what will facilitate bargaining, but
what is the appropriate way of making the governmental decision. If cer-
tain acts may, in some measures, impede bargaining as we have known
it in the private sector, that cannot end our inquiry. Our ultimate con-
cern is not to make collective bargaining work, but to make government
work. My first and basic proposition, then, is that in public employee
bargaining, the fundamental issue to which we should be addressing our-
selves is how the decisions of government should be made.
II. Tin PoLmcAL NATURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
My second and subordinate proposition is that the major decisions made
in bargaining with public employees are inescapably political decisions.
They are political decisions in at least three senses. First, they involve
critical policy choices. The matters debated at the bargaining table and
decided by the contract are not simply questions of wages, hours, vacations
and pensions. Directly at issue are political questions of the size and
allocation of the budget, the tax rates, the level of public services, and
the long term obligations of the government. These decisions as to bud-
gets, taxes, services, arid debts are political in the second sense that, within
our system of government, they are to be made by the political branches
of government-by elected officials who are politically responsible to the
voters. Indeed, these decisions generally are considered uniquely legisla-
tive and not subject to delegation. Finally, these decisions are political
in the ultimate sense that those making the decisions will do in the politi-
cal market what business men do in the economic market-maximize their
gains and minimize their losses. Politically elected officials in bargaining
seek to maximize votes rather than profits.
The major decisions made in public employee bargaining not only are
political, but in my view must be, and ought to be, political. The size
of the budget, the taxes to be levied, the purposes for which tax money
is to be used, the kinds and levels of governmental services to be enjoyed,
and the level of indebtedness are issues that should be decided by officials
who are politically responsible to those who pay the taxes and seek the
services. The notion that we can or should insulate public employee bar-
gaining from the political process either by arbitration or with some magic
formula is a delusion of reality and a denigration of democratic government.
These two propositions-that our central concerns should be the pro-
cesses of governmental decisionmaking, and that the governmental deci-
sions made in collective bargaining are political decisions-focus our in-
quiry on the working of our political processes when decisions concerning
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terms and conditions of employment for public employees are made. Within
this framework, which has a multitude of facets and difficult questions, I
want to deal briefly, and in grossly oversimplified fashion, with three ques-
tions, more to focus on problem areas than to provide solutions. First,
what is the alignment of political interest groups when decisions concern-
ing terms and conditions of employment are made? Second, how does
collective bargaining change the political effectiveness of the competing
interest groups? Third, what are some of the special conditions which
may impair the political process or significantly affect the balance of
political forces?
A. The Political Alignment in Public Employment Issues
In most general terms, the demands of public employees are at the ex-
pense of the taxpayers and the users of public services. This is true
whether or not there is collective bargaining. If a city's employees demand
a wage increase, this can be granted only by increasing taxes or by reduc-
ing the number of employees and, in turn, the level of services. If the
police demand two men in a patrol car, this can be met only by hiring
more police or by reducing the number of patrol cars. The political align-
ment in decisions concerning terms and conditions of employment for
public employees, therefore, finds on one side the public employees, who
want higher wages and benefits with lesser work loads, and on the other
side the taxpayers, who want lower taxes, and the users of public service,
who want more and better services.
This clash of interests can be extremely sharp. Because wages normally
make up 65 to 70 percent of a city's current budget, a general wage in-
crease will increase significantly the tax burden. Where the city's primary
revenue source is the property tax, any increase is plainly visible in the
mill rate and keenly felt in the annual tax bill. Reductions in services
may be less visible and may affect only- selected groups, but they still
generate significant opposition.
In the political contest, public employees are greatly outnumbered by
taxpayers and users of public services. Public employees may compensate
for thig by the intensity of their interest and political activity, their greater
cohesiveness, and their easier access to the machinery of government. Even
at best, however, they may be no match for organized taxpayers, parents,
or community groups and others demanding public services. Whatever
may be the balance of political power, and there may be sharp disagree-
ment both as to what it is and what it should be, the basic alignment is
the public employees on one side and the taxpayers and users of public
service on the other side. Therefore, our inquiries ought to be directed
not only to the question of the proper balance, but also to how various
factors may affect that balance. Only after such inquiries can we decide
sensibly how to construct and manage a public employee bargaining
system.
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B. The Effect of Collective Bargaining on the Political Balance
Collective bargaining creates a special process for making decisions con-
cerning terms and conditions of employment. That process significantly
increases the effectiveness of the public employees' voice in those decisions
in several ways. First, the principle of exclusive representation gives
public employees a unified and authoritative voice. The majority union
becomes the sole spokesman for the employees, and an agreement with
it settles the terms and conditions for all employees in the unit. The ability
to speak with a single voice and to provide a binding settlement gives
added force and political weight to that voice in the public forum.
Second, the bargaining process gives public employees special access to
the political process. They are not limited to speeches at public meetings,
petitions, circulars or personal presentations, as other interest groups are.
The union, representing all employees in bargaining, can compel responsible
officials to sit down at the bargaining table, confront them face to face,
engage in discussion, respond to arguments, state positions, provide reasons
and supply information. The process of interchange continues through
countless meetings of interminable hours until either agreement is reached
or all possibilities are exhausted. This direct and intensive access to
responsible officials, with its structured process of persuasion, gives the
union an especially effective voice in the decisionmaking.
Third, because bargaining normally comes before the budget is adopted,
public employees may obtain prior consideration of their interests, with
collective agreements worked out before other sets of decisions are made.
Once the agreement is made, the ability to consider other interests becomes
limited. Even tentative agreements made at the bargaining table by
negotiators who do not have the power to bind cannot be rejected with-
out political costs. The agreement carries a political force of its own,
giving it a measure of priority over competing claims.
Fourth, if bargaining is conducted behind close doors, as is customary in
the private sector, the union's voice gains added effectiveness. The public
official is confronted with the union's demands and arguments without direct
exposure to the competing demands and arguments. The pressures of hard
bargaining through extended sessions push toward acceptance of the union's
demands at the expense of other interests which are unable to make their
weight felt because they do not know what is being decided at the bar-
gaining table. Once an agreement, even a merely tentative one, is reached
at the bargaining table, the opposing interests are placed at a substantial
political disadvantage. The issue becomes whether the agreement should
be repudiated, rather than what agreement should be made in the first
place.
Fifth, the union by obtaining bargaining rights can build an organiza-
tional structure and develop resources to be used in political forums other
than bargaining. Practically, though not legally, it becomes the voice
of the employees on all political issues. More importantly, it may pro-
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vide the organizational base, if not the financial means, for electing those
who support their bargaining demands and defeating those who oppose
them.
I would emphasize that the political effectiveness of public employees
and their organizations does not necessarily depend upon collective bar-
gaining. Organizations of policemen and firemen were politically power-
ful in many cities long before they obtained bargaining rights. Teachers'
organizations were able to obtain salary increases, reduced classes, and
many other benefits even when they shunned the words "bargaining" and
"negotiations." These organizations were able to bring effective pressure
to bear through the ordinary political channels available to other interest
groups.
Collective bargaining, however, does provide a special process available
only to public employees, and equally available to all classes of public em-
ployees. It significantly increases the political effectiveness of public em-
ployees in determining their terms and conditions of employment, particu-
larly relative to other competing political interest groups. This does not
mean that collective bargaining gives public employees dominant political
power or enables them to obtain more than their fair share. Arrayed against
public employees are the massive interest groups of taxpayers and the users
of public services. Nearly every voter is threatened in one or even both
capacities by union demands which must increase either the size of the
budget or the share allocated to labor costs or both. Those interest groups
are not only massive, but are capable of effective political organization,
as anyone who has confronted taxpayers' leagues, parents' organizations,
property owners' associations, or chambers of commerce well knows. In
my view, one of the principal justifications for public employee bargaining
is that most public employees need this special process to give them an
ability to counteract the overriding political strength of other voters who
constantly press for lower taxes and increased services.
Even collective bargaining without the availability of the strike often
leaves public employees in a vulnerable political position. I have seen
too many cases of taxpayers who, having received wage and salary in-
creases themselves, and daily paying more for every good and service they
buy, adamantly insist that their public employees continue to render the
same service at the same wage. The repeated refrain at bargaining tables
by those representing the public employer, particularly during the last
three years, has been: "We must hold the line. The taxpayers will not
stand for an increase." Nor have these been empty claims, as the wreck-
age of defeated tax and bond referenda testify. Anyone who still believes
that public employee unions can ride roughshod over opposing interest
groups should examine the results of the recent voting, on both candidates
and referenda, in San Francisco.
My central point here, however, is not that collective bargaining gives
public employees too much or too little political effectiveness. That is a
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debate for another day. My purpose here is only to map out in the
boldest relief the competing political forces which operate when decisions
are made as to the terms and conditions of public employment, and to point
out how collective bargaining affects the relative effectiveness of those
competing political groups.
C. Some Special Problems of Political Process
Collective bargaining by public employees creates unfamiliar problems
of political process which at times place unusual stress on that process.
•Our ability to construct and manage a system of public employee bar-
gaining depends largely on our identifying and understanding those prob-
lems, five of which are briefly sketched below.
First is the problem of the smoke-filled room-the problem created by
the parties' insistence that bargaining be carried on behind closed doors.
It may be that in the private sector secret bargaining facilitates reaching
agreement. However, the bargaining is often less secret in fact than in
form. Moreover, though-secrecy may facilitate agreement at the bargaining
table, it may frustrate ratification by the members. But in the public
sector, agreements made in smoke-filled rooms are necessarily suspect. In
principle, it is inappropriate to have public decisions affecting taxes, bud-
gets and public services made by unions and public officials behind closed
doors, so that the public has no knowledge of what is going on until
presented with an agreement.
Such secrecy, by precluding any political reaction by other interest
groups while the agreement is being worked out at the bargaining table,
creates debilitating consequences. When the tentative agreement is pre-
sented, the public does not know what the issues were at the bargaining
table, what facts were presented, or what considerations entered into what
compromises. One consequence is public apathy and a sense of hopeless-
ness in making any critical judgment of the agreement, with the result
of blind acceptance of questionable agreements. At the same time there
is generated public distrust, with a willingness to blame the financial ills
of the city on its collective agreements. The distrust, in turn, leads later
to repudiation by the taxpayers of even the most modest agreements;
ultimately, it creates resistance at the bargaining table to reasonable union
demands. The smoke-filled room manifestly frustrates the democratic
process and ultimately impedes the bargaining process. I am suggesting not
that public employee bargaining be conducted in a goldfish bowl, but
only that the smoke-filled room be opened occasionally to let in a little
light and fresh air, and to let out public knowledge of the issues, the
positions of the parties, and the progress toward agreement.
The second problem I would like to sketch is the problem of the hand-
wringing politician-the public official who claims he is unable to with-
stand the pressures generated by the union for unreasonable demands. If
he believes the union's demands are unreasonable, he should be marshalling
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the opposing political forces-the taxpayers and the users of public services
who have massive political potential-instead of wringing his hands. The
voters often do not realize the ultimate consequences of a union demand
and so do not react. If the police demand a 12 percent increase, the cost
may not seem substantial, but granting this demand may require equivalent
increases for all other public employees. By making taxpayers aware that
what might seem like a minor cost increase will set off a chain reaction
resulting in a 3 mill tax increase, a political leader can build a more than
adequate political counterforce to offset the union's pressure. Similarly,
demands for increases by employees in public works can be translated into
terms understandable to voters, such as less snow removal, more potholes
in the streets, unkempt parks, and unlighted streets. A political leader
who is unable to make that translation and who informs the voters that he
feels compelled to surrender to excessive union demands should be allowed
to wring his hands a final time on election night.
The third problem is what I call the political buck-passer-the political
official who buys a settlement with the union by passing the financial
burden on to future budgets and future taxes. The paradigm example
is the increase in pension benefits which is not fully funded out of the
current budget, so that taxpayers are not aware of the costs of settlement
which they must bear in future years. A more visible, and therefore less
effective, form of buck-passing 'is the two- or three-year contract with
the rear-end load, or even the one-year contract made before election
which requires no increased taxes until after election. In these cases, the
employees appreciate fully the value of the benefits, but the taxpayers
-do not feel the cost until it is too late to respond politically, for those who
made the settlement may have promoted themselves to higher office or
retired to private life.
Eliminating political buck-passing entirely is impossible, but legal re-
strictions could be put on pension plans to require that current financing
reflect current costs, and that future costs be realistically estimated and
be approved in the same manner as that required for long term bonded in-
debtediess. Perhaps we also should put legal limits on contract duration,
so that the political officials responsible for negotiations can be held
politically responsible for their agreements.
The fourth problem is the problem of strange political bedfellows, a
problem that is probably less prevalent in collective bargaining than in
other political decisions, but which in many respects is more troubling.
The normal political alignment, as I have pointed out, joins the taxpayers
and the users of public services in opposition to the demands of public
employees. But this is not always the case. If teachers demand a reduc-
tion in class size to lighten their teaching load, their demand may be
supported by the parents who see smaller classes as providing better
schools. Parents also may see higher teacher salaries, tuition payment
benefits, and many other teacher demands as improving the quality of
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education for their children. Although the parents are taxpayers, they
do not pay the full cost, for non-parents, parents with children no longer
in school, businesses and industries must pay a share of the increased
taxes. The result is that the parents, as users of the service and as tax-
payers, become political bedfellows with the teachers' bargaining repre-
sentative, leaving the remaining taxpayers vulnerable to their combined
pressure.
This problem of political misalignment may take an even more trouble-
some form. When union demands impose increased costs, the political
response may be not to increase taxes or to reduce services generally, but
to obtain the necessary funds by selectively cutting services of politically
impotent groups. Thus, wage increases may be granted by cutting wel-
fare benefits, letting playgrounds deteriorate, closing public hospitals, or
reducing garbage pick-ups in ghetto areas. The union is kept happy,
the opposition of taxpayers is neutralized, and most users of public ser-
vices are unaffected. The opposition is limited largely to groups whose
political voice at the polls is less effective than the union's voice at the
bargaining table.
Finally, I want to call attention to what may be the most difficult prob-
lem of all, the problem of anesthetized taxpayers-that is, taxpayers who
are unaware of the pain of paying taxes. In local political units where
most voters are homeowners and where the primary source of revenue is
the property tax, every increase in taxes is felt keenly and generates strong
political reaction. But in cities where many voters rent housing rather
than own homes, tax increases will not generate as much reaction, for
most renters are quite unaware of property tax increases, which are buried
in rent increases. Even the best efforts of the landlord to persuade renters
that their higher rent is due to higher taxes will seldom succeed. Although
renters are in fact taxpayers, they do not react as taxpayers. As a con-
sequence, they do not provide a reservoir of political resistance to union
demands. In large cities where renters may constitute a majority of the
voters, the dominant pressure may be for increased services and increased
wages, regardless of the increased taxes. To the extent that reliance is
placed on sales taxes or payroll taxes, the taxpayer may be roused from
his slumber, but taxpayers are probably less sensitive to these than to
property taxes.
I have no adequate answers for the last two problems-the problem of
strange political bedfellows and the problem of anesthetized taxpayers.
These exist quite apart from collective bargaining. The politics of
budgetmaking is customarily one of promiscuous bedfellowship, and
anesthetized taxpayers demand services with indifference as to costs, re-
gardless of unions. The added pressures of collective bargaining have
simply aggravated these problems and called them again to our attention.
These shifts in political alignments and the failure of taxpayers to react
to increased labor costs create disparities in bargaining power and may
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lead, in some situations, to high labor costs. A partial, though admittedly
unsatisfying, answer is that we accept comparable conditions in the private
sector with scarcely a quibble. Although some industries, such as the textile
industry in the South, unions cannot bargain effectively and can barely
survive, in other industries, such as local haulage, employers may be
unable to resist union demands. In the private sector we have employers
and unions purportedly bargaining against each other but actually com-
bining to pass off high labor costs to the consuming public. There is
one signal difference: in the private sector the consumers who pay have
no possibility of voting out of office those who negotiated the agreements.
If we examined private sector bargaining as critically as we do public
sector bargaining, we might conclude that it has as many, or more, trouble-
some problems than public sector bargaining.
III. CONCLUSION
My purpose here is not to judge whether public sector bargaining is
a bane or a boon. Nor is it to argue that collective bargaining gives
public employees too little or too much political effectiveness. My pri-
mary concern at the moment is that we ask the right questions, for that
must precede finding the proper answers. The significant questions in
public employee bargaining are questions of governmental decisionmaking:
By what process shall these important policy decisions be made, and by
whom? The answers will not be found by comparing bargaining in the
public sector with bargaining in the private sector, nor by asking simply
what will facilitate bargaining. They will be found only by examining
critically the impact of bargaining on the political process and asking
what will improve that process within the premises of democratic gov-
ernment. The five problems I have sketched- are intended only as samples
of the difficulties which we must recognize and try to meet as problems
of political process. There are others of the same order, which we must
confront if we are to construct and manage a system of collective bar-
gaining appropriate to governmental decisionmaking.
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